When this work was first published in 1960, it immediately filled a void in Kantian scholarship.

This comprehensive history of German philosophy from its medieval beginnings to near the end of the eighteenth century explores the spirit of German intellectual life and its distinctiveness from that of other countries. Beck devotes whole chapters to four great philosophers -- Nicholas of Cusa, Leibniz, Lessing, and Kant -- and extensively examines many others, including Albertus Magnus, Meister Eckhart, Paracelsus, Kepler, Mendelssohn, Wolff, and Herder. Questioning explanations of philosophy by the racial or ethnic character of its exponents, Beck's conclusion (...) is that German philosophy developed as a series of diverse responses to the historical experiences of the German people. The peculiarities of German philosophy must be viewed in the light of German political problems and educational structures. In particular he stresses the importance of the connections between philosophy and Germany's intellectual, literary, religious, and political history. (shrink)

Three of the papers included here have not previously appeared in English, and five have not been published at all.

A comprehensive collection of essays by the philosopher Lewis White Beck.

A collection of Lewis Beck's writings on the philosophy and interpretation of Immanuel Kant.

Can a machine think? More pointedly, if I am a machine, can I think? Beck answers these questions by analyzing two clusters of metaphors -- one of which dramatizes human beings as spontaneous agents (actors), and the other sees them as observers attempting to explain causally their own behavior and that of the actor (spectators). Using a hypothetical scene with two spectators, each explaining an action, and each representing a different way of viewing the world, Beck points up the central (...) philosophical problems raised by the varieties of ways in which we explain our own actions and those of others. (shrink)

The papers in this volume examine Kant's legacy by addressing issues concerning creativity in all aspects of human experience.

A collection of Lewis White Beck's most important essays on Immanuel Kant's philosophy.

1. Terminological Considerations. Since Russell enunciated the principle, “Wherever possible logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities,” or “Wherever possible, substitute constructions out of known entities for inferences to unknown entities,” the terminological situation has become confused. Russell defined neither “construction” nor “inferred entity.” “Construct” soon came to be used for “construction,” perhaps to avoid the ambiguity whereby the latter term was used to refer to both a process and a result. But many writers now use “construction” or (...) “construct” to refer to what Russell called the “inferred entity.” This seems to be the usage of Margenau, Ramsperger, Benjamin, Bures, and many others. Again, some of the same writers in other places remain closer to Russell's usage. And I find it difficult to determine exactly the relation of the usage of some writers to that of Russell because of the differences between their contexts and Russell's. I experience this difficulty in reading, for instance, both Miss Stebbing and Werkmeister. The terminological difficulties have been evaded by some other writers who have formulated new terms to refer to Russell's inferred entities. Thus Northrop speaks of the “theoretic component” and Miller has coined the word, “interphenomena.” The terms reflecting Russell's rule in psychology have become so confused that a set of explicit definitions has recently been proposed. (shrink)

In the modern discussions about possibility of synthetic a priori propositions, the theory of definition has a fundamental importance, because the most definition’s theories hold that analytic judgments are involved by explicit definition . However, for Kant –first author who pointed out the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions–many analytic judgments are made by analysis of concepts which need not first be established by definition. Moreover, for him not all a priori knowledge is analytic. The statement that not all analytic (...) judgment is derived from definition and possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge, indicates Kant didn’t believe, contrary to modern theories about analytic judgment, the definition is an essential ground of knowledge. (shrink)

Hume distinguished the principle that everything has a cause from the principle of the uniformity of nature, Viz., That like causes have like effects. In the second analogy of experience kant attempts to refute what he (erroneously) believed had been hume's explanation of our acceptance of the first principle. He did not there attempt to establish the second principle, But j dodge has shown that the second analogy implicitly contains a justification of the principle of like cause-Like effect. Kant himself, (...) However, Justified the second principle only as a regulative principle of reflective judgment. (shrink)

An eight-volume series, this collection contains comprehensive introductions, notes that encourage discussion, and extensive bibliographies on the history of philosophy. Eighteenth-Century Philosophy presents readings on the history of philosophy, providing the full scope and impact of Western philosophy from the Presocratics to the important thinkers of the twentieth century. Containing many selections that appear in English for the first time, this series presents extensive and carefully chosen selections that emphasize the ranges and significance of the important philosophers of each period (...) and well as their interrelationships with each other and with the intellectual current of their age. (shrink)

Selected Papers from the Third International Kant Congress.

En las discusiones modernas sobre la posibilidad de las proposiciones sintéticas a priori, la teoría de la definición tiene una importancia capital, porque la mayoría de las teorías sostiene que los juicios analíticos están lógicamente implicados en una definición explícita (lo que restringe los enunciados de una definición completa y precisa a juicios de este tipo). Sin embargo, para Kant -el primer autor en señalar la distinción entre proposiciones analíticas y sintéticas-muchos juicios analíticos son obtenidos mediante análisis de conceptos que (...) no precisan ser determinados previamente por una definición. Por otro lado, para él no todo conocimiento a priori es analítico. La afirmación de que no todo juicio analítico se deriva de una definición y la posibilidad del conocimiento sintético a priori indican que Kant no consideraba, contrariamente a las teorías modernas sobre el juicio analítico, que la definición sea un fundamento esencial del conocimiento. In the modern discussions about possibility of synthetic a priori propositions, the theory of definition has a fundamental importance, because the most definition's theories hold that analytic judgments are involved by explicit definition (it limits sentences of complete and precise definition to this kind of judgments). However, for Kant -first author who pointed out the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions-many analytic judgments are made by analysis of concepts which need not first be established by definition. Moreover, for him not all a priori knowledge is analytic. The statement that not all analytic judgment is derived from definition and possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge, indicates Kant didn't believe, contrary to modern theories about analytic judgment, the definition is an essential ground of knowledge. (shrink)